African Leaders and Free Lunches

By Zainab Usman


The popular adage “There’s no such thing as a free lunch” kept crossing my mind in the run-up to the just concluded London Conference on Somalia. I wondered why a gathering focusing on a Sub Saharan African country was to be hosted by the UK government in London, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to be precise. I thought of keeping my musings to myself until I found that a number of people shared the same sentiments, especially my Kenyan friend Kenneth Ochieng who summed up these sentiments on his blog page which I have copied at the end of this post.

Such a global gathering to discuss the way forward out of the litany of problems plaguing Somalia, referred to by policy makers and development experts as the archetypal “failed state” is certainly a commendable and progressive step. This is especially because Somalia’s problems of collapsed state institutions, Al-Shabab terrorism, piracy and humanitarian crisis affect not just Somalia but neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia, and successfully tackling these problems requires a concerted transnational effort with the relevant stakeholders.
 
However, my grouse here is why this gathering heavily attended by many African Heads of States, African multilateral organizations and other world leaders was hosted by British Prime Minister David Cameron in London? Understandably, the safety of dignitaries couldn’t be compromised by holding it in Somalia, thus I wondered why the confab couldn’t be hosted neither by Jonathan in Abuja or Attah Mills in Accra; nor Kibaki in Nairobi in the Horn of Africa within the vicinity of Somalia itself, nor Zuma in Johannesburg. The conference couldn’t convene in the brand new glitzy African Union Headquarters literally built from scratch and furnished by Chinese funds and labour. One could perhaps assume that a conference on the Nigerian Boko Haram insurgency group (probably the next biggest security threat in the region), would be held in some swanky conference hall in Washington D.C., New York, Berlin or Paris.

I simply wonder when African leaders would grow up, be more assertive in handling African affairs and wean themselves off international help over every thing (apparently including having our regional headquarters built for free or confabs on African security held in far away European capitals). Yet at the slightest opportunity, when it suits our African leaders, they utter populist “pan-African” rhetoric about being “dictated-to” and constrained by “imperialist” Western nations. I wonder when we are ever going to grasp the dynamics of international politics and realize that nations hardly do things for others involving massive funds on the basis of pure altruism but mainly based on what would benefit them. When would we start put our own national interests on the front burner before taking any step, in this case seizing the opportunity of such an international gathering to showcase our beautiful capital cities and improve outsiders’ perceptions of Africa for instance, and cut costs associated with funding such international travels?


With the conference over and a laudable communiqué released which inspires some hope on the future of security in Somalia, I hope our African leaders would subsequently consider being more assertive in holding such gatherings in an African country — even though the follow-up conference in June 2012 is billed to take place in Istanbul, Turkey. For one it would show our seriousness in taking charge of our destiny like other developing regions are doing and not painting the image of a helpless, dependent continent. For another it would boost the profile of the city holding such a gathering especially in the international media, and also bring in some foreign revenue to the local economy from hosting and accommodating delegates.


As I stated earlier, Kenneth Ochieng succinctly echoes my sentiments on this issue. Find below his write-up titled Listen Mr. African ‘STATESMAN’: Rants of a Troubled Pan-Africanist originally posted on his blog, Okwarohztake:

OK listen AU, IGAD, EAC, NEPAD and all other multilateral African institutions and ‘statesmen’ who’ve perfected the art of perennially ranting and whining about ‘Western Imperialism’. I am talking as a Pan-Africanist disturbed by the ingenuity, ineptitude and slack of many a folk in the exclusive club of African leadership.  Listen, an intergovernmental, inter-agency summit is underway in London, United Kingdom as I write. It’s the Somalia Conference convened by British Prime Minister David Cameron and his allies to address the troubles and restoration of Somalia. I know you are probably there already – INVITED, and must have carried elaborate delegations with you. Invited to participate? Invited to provide quorum? Or maybe just to be placated? Maybe to be arm twisted like you traditionally have been. Don’t you find it uneasy, disturbing or just funny that you are invited by a foreign entity, the same ‘Western Imperialists’ that you detest so much to deliberate on an endemic African predicament, a shameful scar on the Emblem of Africanism that is squarely on your mandate? Aren’t you a tad bit disturbed by your always sluggish, last-man response to matters of African welfare?

   I listened pensively to presidential speeches at the recently concluded AU summit in Addis Ababa: African leaders whining, distraught and disenfranchised, faulting the West, NATO for their role in the destabilization of an African flagship country – Libya. But come to think of it, beyond that barrage of rhetoric, emotions and the display of flaring tempers orchestrated by the likes of Zimbabwean ‘statesman’ Robert Mugabe, What did you do about Libya? How much seriousness did you commit to standing with an African state? How much resources or even time did you devote to rescuing Libya? After how long did you act? Anyway, I guess my questions could be indeed irrelevant for a people who can’t even agree on a stable AU leadership, a people clearly disillusioned and oblivious of their mandate.

 How shameful it is that you just get invited to an assembly of this calibre. How humbling it is that you will merely sign the resolutions but without the muscle and space to take centre stage in their execution. How I wish this would have been a partnership at the least, a joint caucus of an African multilateral institution with the western allies OR at best an African initiative strategized and executed by Africans drawing in international allies. As it is, I guess you haven’t mustered any serious leverage in these deliberations and you won’t be able to bargain and argue more aptly for Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and Africa. God forbid you might be participating effectively as rubberstamp ink, in a premeditated process of ratifying already engineered English/Western judgements on the prospects for Somalia.

 Isn’t it time you cut the rhetoric and got more proactive, more strategic and more creative in sorting out the challenges bedevilling our beautiful troubled continent? Isn’t it time such big African economies like Nigeria, South Africa as well as promising ones like Ghana, Botswana rolled up their sleeves and contributed more in terms of resources, time and delved into the murky waters of African Unity like their counterparts in Asia, Europe and South America do? 
For as long as you proceed with the prevailing ambivalence about these imperatives, you continue to sell out Africa – Cut the rhetoric folks; get down to work!  

IN THE KILLING FIELDS OF MAIDUGURI - A VIDEO BY VICTORIA IBEZIM-OHAERI

Please view this video by clicking on this link:

IN THE KILLING FIELDS OF MAIDUGURI BY VICTORIA IBEZIM-OHAERI

Between July 24-27, 2011, human rights researcher and community engagement specialist, Victoria Ibezim-Ohaeri embarked on a four day fact-finding mission to Maiduguri, Borno State in order to gain first-hand knowledge of the root of the instability plaguing the State, and document the social, economic and human rights abuses arising from the Boko Haram insurgency in particular. The mission forms part of a broader organizational strategy to gather and present useful information that can aid intelligence gathering and robust decision-making relating to a more effective security provisioning and human rights protection in Nigeria.

The rising spate of insecurity and killings in Borno State has destroyed lives, businesses, deterred future investments, and frustrated important gains made in the realization of specific social and economic rights, especially the rights to housing, education, health, work and food in particular. The Joint Task Force (JTF) constituted by the Federal Government of Nigeria in June 2011 to 'restore order" in Maiduguri has also perpetrated massive human rights violations, by particularly launching direct attacks on civilians as prohibited under national and international law.

In this video recorded on Monday July 25, 2011, she visited Budum community located near the palace of the Shehu of Borno in Maiduguri where a major bomb blast had occurred about 4 p.m. on Saturday, July 23, 2011 and wounded three soldiers. In response to the attack, JTF personnel set shops numbering over 42 ablaze and shot directly at shop owners and residents while they were fleeing the scene of the blasts.

 Alhaji Maina Kaigama, 35, informed that soldiers conducted a house-to-house search, forcing men suspected to be above 18 years out of their homes before shooting them. Six cars with registration numbers AA495 JRE, AA126KDQ, AM96AMG, AA415NGL, DA314FST, AE437 DKW were allegedly vandalized and burnt by the soldiers.

Although the Joint Task Force (JTF) authorities vehemently denied the arson and killings, the mission identified and visited the homes of one wounded victim and four persons allegedly killed by JTF soldiers: Late Mallam Goni Tijani,(55), Late Babakura Zakariya (18), Late Idris M, and the woman in whose shop the improvised explosive device (IED) was planted. In this video, Victoria Ohaeri joined the family, relatives and friends of Late Mallam Goni Tijani at a fidau (funeral) prayer held on Monday, July 25, 2011 in Budum, Maiduguri. She learned that soldiers invaded the home of Late Mallam Goni Tijani and could see the walls of his home riddled with bullets. They forced him out of his room and shot him to death right in front of his family members and children most of whom are below the age of six. His two shops were burnt leaving his two wives and 11 children with nothing to depend on.

Mohammed Zakariya, 20, and Mustapha Imam, elder brother and close friend of Late Babakura Zakariya who witnessed the shooting of Babakaru Zakariya wept uncontrollably as they shared the account of his brutal murder by JTF soldiers. The deceased's aged father tearfully told her how JTF soldiers dragged the deceased out of his mother's room onto the streets. He knelt down, and pleaded with the soldiers to spare his life. He died on the spot after he was shot on the head, chest and waist by the soldiers. Severely wounded Baba Sani Mohammed, shop owner at Budum Market is receiving treatment in his home following a life-threatening gunshot injury said to have been inflicted on him by JTF soldiers while he was fleeing from the burning market.

With its personnel increasingly accused of human rights violations and involvement in criminal activities such as arson, rape and brutal killings, the JTF is struggling with image problems and there are increasing calls for its withdrawal. In all the sub-urban communities: Gomari, London Chiki, Kaleri, Budum visited, residents unanimously clamored for the soldiers to return to their barracks.

Bloodshed, Pandemonium Trail the Joint Task Force’s (JTF’s) Manhunt for Boko Haram Sect’s Members in Budum Community, Maiduguri

By Victoria Ibezim-Ohaeri

Yesterday night, Sunday, February 12, 2012, pandemonium, fear, anxiety and bloodshed characterized the Joint Task Force’s (JTF’s) manhunt for members of the Boko Haram sect in Budum community, located near the place of the Shehu of Borno, in Maiduguri, Borno State. There are growing concerns that the fundamental rights and freedoms of local residents may have been threatened and violated in the course of JTF’s anti-insurgency operations.

The JTF soldiers allegedly invaded the community at about 9 p.m., shooting sporadically, burning buildings as they conducted a house-to-house search for members of the Boko Haram sect. Fearing violent attacks by the soldiers, many families, especially young men fled their homes and sought refuge in a local mosque in the community.

The first call came in at 9.15 p.m. The Hausa accent was too thick, and I could hardly comprehend the information being conveyed to me. But from the tone of the messenger, there was trouble. Few minutes later, another call came in from a local contact that calls me regularly. Fear, apprehension was clearly evident in his entire narrative. Without the regular exchange of pleasantries, he informed about the heavy presence of soldiers in their community, and that some buildings were allegedly being burnt with occupants inside. The caller hung up immediately, giving me no time to interrogate his claims.

Almost immediately, another call came through. “Villagers are trooping to the mosque to hide. Deafening gunshots have caused residents, especially our women and children to scamper for safety. Soldiers are moving from house-to-house looking for our men, and burning down some houses. Please come to our help”. That was the local Imam that lives beside a small mosque in Budum community, near the Shehu of Borno’s palace. The news left me speechless and confused for several minutes.  

I was jolted back to consciousness by two subsequent calls from unfamiliar numbers and callers. I always pick my calls as long as its work related. Somebody must have spread my number round urging people to call me. Then, the 5^th caller or so came through, this time around, a woman. I could hear the screams of children in the background. I could hear several voices and jostling feet as though people were running. That call came in exactly at 10.01 p.m. That particular call hit me like a thunderbolt, and I knew right then that it wasn’t a hoax.

 The JTF routinely applies a combatant policy that designates any area used by the sect to perpetrate their operations as a military target. “Persons who allow their surroundings or frontage to be used by the Boko Haram sect to attack people or security agencies would be considered as collaborators, and will be treated as criminals,” JTF told me during a fact-finding mission to Maiduguri in July last year. In response to a major bomb blast that wounded three soldiers on Saturday, July 23, 2011, a similar reprisal attack by the JTF in Budum community left three men - Late Mallam Goni Tijani, (55), Late Babakura Zakariya (18), Late Idris M - dead. They were allegedly shot dead in front of their homes by the JTF soldiers following a violently rigorous house-to-house search. Could that be the reason why the men in particular, escaped at the sight of the soldiers?

First off, I sent text messages to some senior members of the Joint Task Force in Maiduguri. I began to call everyone I knew that had some influence and access to the people “above”, including my contacts and colleagues in the local media, Amnesty International, United Nations and other international organizations. Lucky enough, I was able to speak with the JTF authorities exactly at 10.05 p.m. They confirmed the incident, explaining that some of their men had been attacked and killed by the Boko Haram sect hiding among residents within Budum community in Maiduguri. Two soldiers were allegedly, severely wounded and hospitalized. “Yes, we have launched a house-to-house search to fish out the assailants, but we are observing the rules of engagement. We are rescuing the women and children first….But they must produce their husbands…The Boko Haram members are using the mosques as a shield”, said JTF.                      

                                                                       

For me, the JTF’s statement was a corroboration of the community narratives, or at least, it helped to fill in the blank spaces. From the various narratives of the residents, the JTF, and private citizens, it is easy to deduce an extremely violent reprisal attack had taken place.  About five houses have been burnt down in Budum community. Several persons were arrested and taken to an undisclosed location while many families still await the return of their loved ones and family members. The number of the dead casualties remains unknown, but it hovers between 12 and 15.

Between July 24-27, 2011, I conducted a fact-finding mission to Maiduguri to gain first-hand information into the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency as well as fully understand governmental responses to the mounting insecurity in the northern part of the country. As stated in the mission report, the ‘In the Killing Fields of Maiduguri”, the Nigerian Government must take urgent and concrete measures towards reviewing and re-directing the operational methods, processes and procedures of the Joint Task Force to be in tune with the democratic environment and attributes of the rule of law, due process and respect for human rights. When the state fails to prevent systematic denials or violations of citizen’s right, and paying due regard to the special needs of women and children especially in periods of emergency, this failure is a fundamental human rights violation.

Absolute mistrust, suspicion, and fear characterize the relationship between the security operatives and the local populations, undermining intelligence undertakings that would lead to the definite identification and extirpation of the sect’s members and activities. Areas lived by the poor are often criminalized and labeled as Boko Haram hideouts to justify the extreme security surveillance and violent incursions by soldiers. Often, these incursions are accompanied by severe violence, with victims on many occasions arrested, detained and in some cases, killed.

Based on the sentiments shared by several persons interviewed in Budum Community in July last year, I realized that the greater the force employed by the JTF in the areas designated as military targets, the greater the sympathy those affected communities have for the Boko Haram sect, to the extent that majority of them are hesitant or outrightly unwilling to provide information to the police on the hideouts and activities of the sect members.

While acknowledging the bravery and commitment of the JTF soldiers toward stamping out vicious elements behind the violence, insecurity and fundamentalism witnessed in the northern part of the country, concrete steps must be taken to integrate respect for human rights into their engagement strategies, peacekeeping and peace-building efforts. Most importantly, strengthening respect for human rights is a critical step towards the re-establishment of a climate of peace in the northern region.   

“JUSTICE DELAYED IS NOT JUSTICE DENIED”

By Victoria Ibezim-Ohaeri

The January 30, 2012 death sentence slammed on Hamza Al Mustapha and Lateef Shofolahan by a Lagos High Court finally brought the protracted trial of the former Chief Security Officer to Nigeria’s ex-maximum ruler, Sani Abacha and the personal aide to late Kudirat Abiola to an inglorious end. Widely acclaimed as a victory for the rule of law and validation of the revered principle of ubi jus ubi remedium (where there is a wrong, there is remedy), the judgment by Justice Mojisola Dada, placed a firm lid on the pot pourri of dilatory tactics, theatrical displays, and legal fireworks that coloured the 15 year-long tortuous legal battle for justice over the murder of Alhaja Kudirat Abiola.


The passage of time has seen significant changes in the legal, social and political landscape, the emergence of new issues and social contradictions, and the reconfiguration and transfor¬mation of the active social, legal and human forces. This protracted nature of the trial has regrettably, been misconstrued in some quarters, as a fundamental breach or degrading treatment of such a scale and character that qualify the accused persons to be discharged or even acquitted. In my view, this argument is blatantly flawed and laughable considering the fact that the guilt of an accused person is not purged by reason of effluxion of time.


Under section 316 of the Criminal Code Act CAP C38, LFN 2004, taking away another person’s life in circumstances which are not authorized, justified or excused by law are expressly prohibited. As was incontrovertibly established by the prosecution during the trial, subsections 1 and 2 of that law requires that mere proof of intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm is sufficient. In the English case of Hyam Vs. DPP (1974)2 AER 41, the House of Lords held that an intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm is established “if it is proved that the accused deliberately and intentionally did an act knowing that it was highly probable that it would result in the grievous bodily harm to the victim, even though he did not desire that result”. Hamza’s role in providing guns used for the deadly operation, and Shofolahan’s treacherous provision of intelligence that enabled the killer squad to effectively track and kill the late wife of the winner of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, Chief MKO Abiola were upheld by the court as sufficient evidence of intent to kill, which is a basic ingredient for the establishment of the crime of murder.

As a young law school intern, then assigned to Justice Olubunmi Oyewole’s Court, I witnessed firsthand, how the defense attorneys employed every known dilatory tactic and wacky technicalities to frustrate the expeditious hearing of the case. We were then required to take copious notes of the often annoying proceedings in the celebrated trial. Without restraint, counsel to Hamza Mustapha, Olalekan Ojo Esq. lavishly hurled abuses at the trial judge, and quite routinely, used despicable language to address the court. Plethora of judicial authorities and tons of literature on criminal jurisprudence were often cited to support a single legal argument or motion, causing serious holdups in the progression of trial. Ostensibly irked by the unnecessary dramas and delays in the trial, it wasn't surprising when General Bamaiyi and the other co-accused persons requested for a separate trial.  In fact, it’s an aberration for the same party responsible for the delay to rely on his inactions as an excuse to escape punishment.

As Hafsat Costello-Abiola, the eldest daughter of the late Kudirat Abiola rightly stated, the verdict handed down by the Lagos Court serves as a notice that justice delayed is not justice denied. It also affirms and increases public confidence in the judiciary as the last bastion of hope for the common man. With the latest appeal by the condemned persons challenging the High Court’s verdict before the appellate court, this might just be the beginning of another legal sojourn through the corridors of judicial gymnasium. The long wait for justice continues!

Memoirs.....S4C's televised youth debate on Galaxy TV

TOPIC: 'ENDING THE BOKO HARAM VIOLENCE: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD"

STATION: GALAXY TV (UHF 27 on STARTIMES)

PROGRAMME: Democracy and the Rule of Law

DATE: Sunday, January 1, 2012

TIME: 4 P.M.

DISCUSSANTS: Shettima Yerima, President, Arewa Youth Consultative Forum

Favour Afolabi: Public Analyst, Social Commentator

Ndutimobong Enang: Public Policy Analyst

Victoria Ohaeri: Human Rights Lawyer, Blogger, Researcher

 

 

 

STUDENTS, PARENTS, BEWARE! FAKE JAMB ADMISSION SYNDICATE IN LAGOS!

 A cybercafe allegedly being run at No 9 Ojora Road, beside JAMB Office Ikoyi Lagos is involved in massive Joint Admissions Matriculation Board (JAMB) admission scams. The cyber cafe being operated within the Nigeria Police quarters in Ikoyi is reportedly engaged in duping unsuspecting students desperately seeking admission into various Nigerian universities and polytechnics.

The attached 'admission letter' issued to Master Lucky Odigie after parting with huge sums of money attests to the authenticity of this claim! The cybercrime has been going on for some time now and JAMB officials with the security men appear helpless!

Dear students and parents, beware of the touts and criminals that operate in the cyber café. For admission matters, kindly proceed straight to the nearby JAMB office located at 11 Ojora Road, Ikoyi, Lagos.

Do not follow any touts into the next building where you will be duped.

Please share this information.

AIG M.D. Abubakar: Can this man be trusted with national security?

WHITE PAPER ON JOS KILLINGS

By Hon. Justice Niki Tobi

4.3 Alhaji M.D. Abubakar: The former Commissioner of Police

4.4 Of all the individuals, groups and organizations who were mentioned in the various memoranda as having played one role or the other with regard to the crisis, none received more scathing comments than Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, the Plateau State Commissioner of Police at the time of the crisis. He served in that capacity from 16/7/2000 to 16/11/2001. His name was mentioned in not less that fifty percent of the memoranda submitted to the Commission with varying degrees of condemnation of his role before and during the crisis. Such memoranda include Exhibits L, 16, 48, 52, 257, 470, 507, 521 and 524 among many others.

The oral evidence of witnesses before the Commission is equally replete with allegations that Alhaji M.D. Abubakar was responsible in one way or the other for causing the crisis or failing to curtail its severity or extent. The only dissenting voice is that of Assistant Commissioner of Police, Dominic Yadubiya, the Area Commander who signed and presented Exhibit 79, the Memorandum of the office of the Commissioner of Police, Plateau State Command. While not condemning Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, Yadubiya did not praise him either.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.5 The criticism of Alhaji M.D. Abubakar’s role in the crisis stems from the fact that apart from being a member of the State Security Council, he was at the helm of the Plateau State Police Command whose admitted primary and constitutional role is to provide security of life and property to the people of the State. He was accused variously of neglecting or even undermining this role with serious consequences for the government and the people.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.6 There is abundance of evidence that before the crisis erupted on 7th September, 2001 there was palpable tension in the air arising mainly from the controversial appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed as the NAPEP Co-ordinator for Jos North Local Government Council. There were threats of violence expressed in the various correspondences written to the Government some of which were copied to him, the Commissioner of Police e. g Exhibit B, 70 and 71 among others. There were also the flyers containing threats to the life of Mukhtar pasted all around his office by unknown persons and the flyers being circulated in Jos allegedly written by the Hausa Fulani under 25 indicating that there would be violence if Mukhtar was not allowed to remain in office as NAPEP Co-ordinator. When Alhaji Abubakar testified before the Commission, he admitted knowledge of all these and agreed that he knew that some kind of violence was in the offing.

He was examined by Mr. Okereafor and this is how it went:

M.U. Okereafor: “When you saw these leaftlets, you should have known there was tension on ground”

M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”

Earlier on, it had gone like this:

M.U. Okereafor: The summary of all these leaftlets is that there was going to be a kind of violence involving lives”

M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”

M.U. Okereafor: “And you have told the Commission that the Police was aware of these leaftlets”

M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”

He was cross-examined by Mr. G. S. Pwul, leading counsel to the Commission as follows:

G.S. Pwul: “With such leaflets, did you sense that an unusual development was about to occur? Did the leaflets signal thatan unusal development was about to happen?

M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”

G.S. Pwul: “If you did identify them, the right thing to do was to arrest them”

M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”

G.S. Pwul: “And that would have forestalled the problem of September”

M.D. Abubakar: “Yes and it would give us an insight as to why such leaflets were flying”

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.7 While being led by his counsel, Mr. O. Uket in his evidence in chief, he said as follows:

M.D. Abubakar: “Before the crisis of 7th September, there were a lot of rumours and a lot of leaflets due to the appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar as the Co-ordinator of NAPEP for Jos North Local Government. As the Commissioner of Police and jointly with other Security agents, we conducted distress investigations

about the happenings and we took certain security measures... We brought this to the notice of the government at the State Security Council meeting.”

O. Uket: “...what recommendations did you give the Government to stem the tension?”

M.D. Abubakar: “We became worried. I personally became very worried. I saw leaflets flying. There were leaflets reading “blood for blood” and others...”

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.8 Alhaji Abubakar also admitted that he was aware that tyres were burnt in front of the Jos North Local Government Secretariat and also in front of the Gbong Gwom Palace which he agreed was unlawful.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.9 The major accusation against Alhaji Abubakar on this score is that with knowledge of all these events, he never caused the matter to be investigated so that those found to be behind these obvious threats to peace could be apprehended. But in his defence he said that he could not have anyone arrested because he did not know whom they were as none of the leaflets was signed by anybody. He said that he instructed that a detachment of police be deployed to Jos North Local Government and detectives sent to look for information relating to the crisis that was brewing as a result of Mukhtar’s appointment. He also said that he brought the issue up at the State Security Council meeting where it was agreed that the Government should look into the matter by calling all the interested parties with a view to finding out what was on ground in order to solve the problem.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.10 Very significantly too, CW 41, Emmanuel Jok Bettah testified in line with his memorandum. Exhibit 52, that meetings were held by Muslims at Laranto Motor Park, Angwan Rogo and Gangare where the opposition to the appointment of Mukhtar was discussed and it was decided to set Jos ablaze on Friday 31st August, 2001 and that no `arne’ (infidel) would escape. He said he personally attended the meeting at Laranto Motor Park in disguise on 25th August, 2001. Among the decisions taken according to CW41, was the arrangement to stockpile arms, guns and knives in the Central Mosque and the houses of certain individuals.

According to CW41, the Chairman Jos North Local Government Council, Dr. Frank Tardy, the heads of Churches and Muslims who did not support the plan were to be the prime targets. He said he wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police which he personally delivered informing him of what he had seen and heard. A copy of his letter was admitted in evidence as Exhibit 53. He said he did not receive any reply to Exhibit 53 and added that the attack did not take place on 31st August, 2001 as planned because it rained on that day but that it happened on 7th September, 2001. Neither in his memorandum Exhibit 79, nor in his oral testimony did Alhaji Abubakar make any allusion to this vital evidence. It therefore stands uncontroverted and against him.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.11 The Plateau State Youth Council, for its part, held a press conference on 31st August, 2001, the text of which was admitted as Exhibit S. Stating their opposition to Mukhtar’s appointment but at the same time blaming the Jasawa Development Association for any breach of the peace or breakdown of law and

order that might occur in the State.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.12 The press conference ended with a call on the “security operatives” to arrest and be made to face the law all the “agents of destabilization and their sponsors”.

4.13 The summary of the above scenario is that Alhaji M. D. Abubakar as Commissioner of Police was fully aware of the volatile situation that existed at the time but did nothing about it until it exploded on 7th September, 2001. Far more serious, however, is the allegation that he not only failed to take action to avert the crisis, but took certain active steps to facilitate it, for which he was accused

of bias and even complicity. It was suggested before us that being himself a Muslim, Alhaji Abubakar took sides with the Muslims and that using his position, he did certain things to aid the Muslims against the Christians in a crisis that had long been planned by the Muslims.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.14 Appendix 12 to Exhibit 75 is a letter dated 29th August, 2001 by which Alhaji Abubakar, Commissioner of Police, Plateau State ordered the postings and transfers of thirty one Divisional Police Officers within Plateau State Command to different locations within the State “with immediate effect”. The letter was addressed to the Area Commander, Langtang, the Assistant Commissioner of Police `D’ Department (CID) Jos and All Divisional Police Officers of the Nigeria Police, Plateau State Command. The letter ended with the following instruction:

“2. Handing and taking over in respect of these postings should be completed latest by 3rd September, 2001 unfailingly. Date of respective arrivals at the new stations should be communicated to this State Headquarters immediately.”

4.15 When, during his oral testimony, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar was asked why he made those postings at the time he did bearing in mind that there was so much tension in the State. He said the postings were made because of the approaching retirement of three Divisional Police Officers, those of Barkin Ladi, Nasarawa Gwong and Bukuru. In his words:

“It is true that there were postings at Barkin Ladi, Nasarawa Gwong and Bukuru. This is the prerogative of the Commissioner of Police. We were not expecting crisis. These people were going on retirement and before you go on retirement, you take one month’s leave to get prepared for retirement. That is why the woman DPO in Barkin Ladi was changed. The man in Bukuru and the man in Nasarawa Gwong were changed. The situation brought changes and this was necessitated by their retirement period and I eased them out to put officers who are capable of taking care of these Divisions. That is why we made these transfers.”

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.16 There is also Exhibit 472 which is a Radio Message dated 7th September 2001 from Alhaji Abubakar, former Commissioner of Police to the Divisional Police Officers of Angware, Bassa and Riyom withdrawing the ALGON vehicles allocated to them to the State Headquarters. No explanation was given as to why this was done.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.17 Several memoranda and several witnesses also accused Alhaji Abubakar of providing adequate security for mosques, especially the Central Mosque, Jos by posting policemen to be on guard while no Church was guarded or protected by the police, suggesting that he took sides with the Muslims against the Christians. In answer to this charge, Alhaji Abubakar said that during the crisis, the Area Commander was instructed that all mosques and churches be guarded by policemen.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.18 Exhibit 79 is the memorandum submitted by the Office of the Commissioner of Police. In the substance, it corroborates the evidence of Alhaji Abubakar, affirming that in the face of mounting tension in Jos North Local Government Council Area, he alerted the Plateau State Government about the situation and advised that a meeting of the State Security Council be held with all interest groups.When the meeting was held, he, Alhaji Abubakar, was not invited. Generally, in Exhibit 79 and in his oral testimony, Alhaji Abubakar denied the allegations made against him and explained the steps taken by him to contain the crisis between the 7th and 12th of September, 2001. These included the deployment of conventional and Police Mobile Force men to the areas of conflict, the request for more menand arms from the Inspector General of Police and the request for the assistance of the Military for a joint operation with the Police.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.19 There can be no doubt that the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar knew that something unusual involving violence was about to happen. That much was admitted by him and that was why he called for a meeting of the State Security Council. The hostile and war-like leaflets that were threatening bloodshed circulating all over the city of Jos, the forceful prevention of Mukhtar from occupying his office, the burning of tyres at the Jos North Local Government Secretariat and the Press Conference by the Plateau State Youth Council calling on the security agencies to arrest the agents of destabilization in our view, provided sufficient materials to make him take such measures as would nip the crisis in the bud or at least ensure that if it eventually erupted as it did, it could be effectively tackled and put down before much damage could be done. And if he was still unsure of what to do, C.W.41 had written to him, Exhibit 53, explaining how meetings were held by some Muslim groups where plans were made to attack some people and churches with arms that were to be distributed from certain locations.

In the face of all these warning signals, we are, to say the least, very surprised that apart from calling for a meeting of the State Security Council to discuss the issue and his general statement that he deployed policemen to the Jos North Local Government Secretariat and detectives to look for information, he did nothing to avert the crisis. No serious investigation was carried out to fish out the belligerent groups and find out the extent of their plans, if any, and no arrests were made in spite of the fact that some of the dangerous leaflets were allegedly written by the “Hausa Fulani under 25”, a group which could, with some diligence be identified. His reason for not investigating or making any arrests was that no names were written on the leaflets and that the people behind them could not therefore be identified. Police have investigated such matters in the past. These events are so glaring and dramatic that we find it extremely difficult to excuse or justify Alhaji Abubakar’s handling of the situation. A diligent Commissioner of Police would not only have thoroughly investigated the matter before it happened, but would ensure that if the matter degenerated into the kind of bloodbath that eventually took place, his men were ready to contain it. He should have put them on red alert, but he never did. With his knowledge of the very volatile situation on ground, he ought to have made contingency arrangements with higher police authorities such that if widespread violence broke out he could receive immediate assistance by the deployment of more men and arms before the situation could get out of hand.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.20 The evidence before the Commission is that because of the serious constraints under which the police operate throughout the country, when the crisis broke out on 7th September, 2001, the police were outnumbered and outgunned by the rioters and consequently, the police could not handle the situation, as confirmed by CW52, ACP Dominic Yadubiya. Alhaji Abubakar did request for reinforcements during the crisis and these came from Benue, Kaduna and Gombe Commands but it was too late. The damage had already been done. Had he placed his men on the alert and requested for rapid deployment from other commands in case of a breakdown of law and order, the police would have been more successful in managing the crisis and many lives and properties that were lost or destroyed could have been saved. The evidence before the Commission shows that it was the presence of the Military that brought the situation under control.

The inability of the police to handle the situation resulted largely from the poor handling of the crisis by the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar at whose doorstep the blame must be laid. We are strengthened in this view by the evidence of CW330, the Secretary to the Plateau State Government.

CW330 told the Commission that the Government was misled by the security reports given to it by the Police Command headed by its Commissioner, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar. The reports gave the Government the false impression that all was well and there was no cause for alarm. It was on the strength of these reports that the government assured the people that the situation was under control. The Secretary to the State Government in his testimony informed the Commission that it was known that an attack or demonstration was planned to take place on 31st August, 2001 and that there was an unusual movement of people contrary to the a ssurances given by the Commissioner of Police that the situation was undercontrol. Even when the crisis broke out in Congo-Russia, the Commissioner of Police continued to assure government that the situation was under control until it became clear to everybody that it was not, and the President had to be contacted to allow the Military to intervene. CW330 described the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji Abubakar as “totally unreliable”. In fact even when Government informed him of the influx of visitors into Jos especially in Zangon Baki and Mista Ali areas and expressed its concern over it, Alhaji Abubakar did nothing.

If Alhaji M.D. Abubakar had performed his duties well he would not have given the government that false sense of security that turned out to be fatal. In the light of this, the conclusion is inescapable that the former Commissioner of Police is guilty of, at best, gross negligence and at worst, sheer incompetence. This is on the passive side that is, on what he failed or omitted to do.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.21 On the active side, it was alleged that the crisis occurred as a result of a premeditated and well planned attack on the Christian community by some Muslim groups with the active connivance of Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, he being a Muslim. In support of this allegation, evidence was given of Alhaji Abubakar’s conduct in three areas, namely, the transfer of some Divisional Police Officers shortly before the crisis, his withdrawal of the ALGON vehicles on the day the crisis erupted i.e. 7th September, 2001 and the imbalance in the provision of police security to places of worship during the crisis.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.22 Let us now examine each of these in turn.

(i) The transfer of some Divisional Police Officers: Appendix 12 to Exhibit 75 is a letter dated 29th August, 2001, by which the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, ordered the immediate transfer of thirty one Divisional Police Officers mainly within Jos and its environs from one Division to another. While most of the transfers were within the Jos area, some of them involved officers in places as far away as Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Pankshin, Kanke, and Wase. The evidence was that Alhaji Abubakar had foreknowledge of the crisis and that the transfers were made at such a critical time with the aim of disabling the officers from being effective in handling the crisis when it came. He denied the evidence and said that the posting of police officers is the prerogative of the Commissioner of Police. He said, and as indicated above, the transfers were made in preparation for the retirement of the Divisional Police Officers of Barkin Ladi, Nassarawa Gwong and Bukuru. He had to make the transfers so that these Divisions could be manned by capable hands. He called the exercise “routine changes” but admitted that with the situation where crisis was brewing it was not a responsible act to make such changes. He however said that it was not done with any bad intention.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.23 The Commission finds Alhaji Abubakar’s explanation for the transfer of thirtyone Divisional Police officers because of the approaching retirement of three of them most unsatisfactory. In fact he could not really explain why he did it. The fact that it was done at a most inauspicious time lends credence to the fact that it was done with the ulterior motive of rendering the officers ineffective in their new places of posting. And if that is so, it must be because he knew of the planned attack by the Muslim groups and wanted to make it easy for them to succeed in their bid. Otherwise, how does one explain the fact that the transfers were made on 29th August, 2001 with the firm instruction that “Handing and taking over in respect of these postings should be completed latest by 3rd September 2001 unfailingly? And he added “Date of respective arrivals at the new stations should be communicated to this State Headquarters immediately.”

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.24 Assuming the officers got the notice of transfer the same day, i.e. 29th August 2001, they had less than five days within which to complete their movements and take over the new Divisions. The reason for this extreme urgency was not explained before us and we think the postings are far from being the innocent “route changes” he branded them to be, especially in the light of his admission under cross-examination that it takes time for a person to study the files he will take over in the new Station. Our view is that while Alhaji Abubakar’s postings of 29th August 2100, may not by themselves prove conclusively that he took sides with the Muslims against the Christians, taken together with the other two factors, they provide strong circumstantial evidence of his partisanship.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.25 This is more so when one considers the evidence of CW330 that the State Security Council was informed by intelligence reports that the Muslims were planning a march in Jos on 7th September, 2001. Alhaji Abubakar did not take us to the bottom of this issue of sudden transfer.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.26(ii) The withdrawal of ALGON Vehicles

It is a matter of common knowledge that all Local Government Council in the Country were provided with one vehicle each, (Toyota Jeep) to assist the police in its fight against crime. These vehicles are popularly referred to as ALGON vehicles. There is evidence that on 5th September, 2001, two days before the crisis erupted in Jos, the ALGON vehicles allocated to Angware, Bassa and Riyom Divisions were withdrawn through a wireless message, Exhibit 472, sent to these Divisions from the office of the Commissioner of Police for what is simply described as “special duty”. The vehicles were ordered to be released to the State Headquarters on Friday, 7th September, 2001, the day the civil disturbances erupted. Again there is no conclusive proof that it w5as done to facilitate the crisis.

However, these areas are within the environs of Jos and no reason was given for their withdrawal. While we cannot speculate as to why they were withdrawn, we must say that the timing of the withdrawals was curious and they would definitely have the effect of crippling the operations of those Divisions in time of crisis. In the absence of any explanation coming from the Commissioner of Police, the Commission cannot say that the withdrawals for “special duty” which was unspecified were done in good faith or with a proper motive. We are more inclined to believe that the vehicles were withdrawn to satisfy the commissioner’s hidden agenda.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.27 The unbalanced protection given to places of Worship: One of the most serious allegations against Alhaji M.D. Abubakar is that he took sides in the provision of protection to places of worship in a battle which he knew was fought along religious lines. It was very strongly alleged that during the crisis he gave police protection to the mosques in Jos, especially the Central Mosque, while he deliberately left the churches to the mercy of the rioters. This point is made in so many memoranda that it is impossible for the Commission to ignore it. While it will be tedious for us to reproduce all that was said before us on this very weighty matter, some examples taken from a few of the memoranda will suffice.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.28(i) Page 8, paragraph 2 of Exhibit 498 (Memorandum No. 102/2001)

“Curiously, the Police prior to the Friday prayers heavily guarded the Central Mosque in Jos, while no security was provided for the churches in Jos. Paradoxically, the mosques were not under any form of threat on Friday 7, September, given that attack was launched on unsuspecting Christians. Yet many churches within a range of 200 to 500 metres from the Central mosque in Jos were burnt either fully or partially on the afternoon of that Friday.

The Police in Plateau State will be the only group to account for this unbalanced action, which speaks volumes about the nature of policing in Jos and the rest of Plateau State.”

4.29(ii) Page 12, paragraph 3 of Exhibit 334 (Memorandum No. 342/2001)

“While innocent lives were freely taken from armless people, the best the Commissioner of Police could do was to protect the Central Mosque and other mosques at different locations in the town. No police protection was sent to any church.”

4.30(ii) Page 17 paragraph 1 of Exhibit 44 (Memorandum No. 20/2001)

“While all churches, Government establishments and other strategic premises were left helpless and at the mercy of the muslim hoodlums, the police were seen armed to the teeth strategically guarding the Jos Central Mosque.”

4.31(I) Page 8 paragraphs 2 and 3 of Exhibit 75 (Memorandum No. 102/2001)

“The Police Commissioner, M. D. Abubakar, who coincidentally hails from Zamfara had a field day, given the timely exit of the Chief Security Officer of the State, the Governor.... Most police were stationed to protect mosques, especially the Central and Dilimi Mosques.”

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.32 Both Alhaji Abubakar and CW52 denied this allegation and it was strongly denied in their memorandum, Exhibit 79. The evidence of Alhaji Abubakar and CW52 is that CW52 was instructed by Alhaji Abubakar and that he in turn instructed the various Divisional Police officers to provide police protection to all places of worship, both churches and mosques, within their respective areas. There is evidence before the Commission that Alhaji Abubakar’s normal places of worship on Fridays was the Mosque attached to the prisons near his office.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.33 However, on this particular day, 7th September 2001 he worshipped at the Central Mosque. Alhaji Abubakar testified that he worshipped at the Central Mosque on 7th September, 2001 at the request of one of his friends who persuaded him that both of them should worship at the Central Mosque and not at the Prison Mosque.

He said:

“On Friday, 7th September when I was about to go to the mosque, a colleague of mine from Interpol at the Police Staff College called me to go to the mosque. Usually, I have two places of worship, the Central Mosque and the Prison Mosque. If not for my friend, I would have gone to the Prison mosque. He called me to wait for him so that we could go to the mosque. He said he wanted to go to Kano after the Mosque. He convinced me to go to the Central Mosque. We prayed outside because we got there late. I never pray outside. Two minutes after the prayers, we left immediately. On the way back, my friend took off on Kano and I went back to my office.”

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.34 He said he took five policemen to the Central Mosque as his escorts but did not notice the presence of other policemen there during or after the prayers. From this story, certain pertinent questions come to mind.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.35(i) Since he never prays outside the mosque, what was so special about the Central Mosque on that day that made him yield to his friend’s prompting to drive all the way to the Central Mosque at the risk of arriving late and praying outside when he could have conveniently prayed inside the prison mosque which is just across the road from his office? Could it be because he wanted to police the situation at the Central Mosque, knowing what was about to happen?

4.36(ii) Having instructed that Mosques be guarded on Fridays and churches on Sundays as stated by him, why did he not take advantage of his presence at the Central Mosque to find out if his instruction was being implemented? Could this apparent lack of interest be because he knew what was about to happen, having made adequate arrangements for the protection of the Central Mosque? His behaviour in this regard is, to say the least, strange, if not abnormal.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.37 From the evidence before the Commission, there can be little doubt that the Jos Central Mosque was well guarded on the day of the crisis. The only question is whether this protection was extended to the churches as well and if not, whether the omission was deliberate. Alhaji Abubakar and CW52 both admitted that churches which were in the vicinity of the Central Mosque, namely, COCIN Sarkin Mangu and Assemblies of God Church were burnt on 7th September 2001 while the Central Mosque was neither burnt nor damaged. Many houses and shops at Enugu Road very near or opposite the Central Mosque were also either set on fire or damaged. All these were viewed by the Commission during its visit to the locus in quo. C.W.52 and Alhaji Abubakar admitted that these churches were burnt down while the Central Mosque was left intact. They could not say why it was possible to burn all these structures while the Central Mosque remained untouched especially when it is known that some other mosques around the city were also burnt. It is obvious to the Commission that the Central Mosque was not burnt like the churches, shops and houses around it because it was heavily guarded by the police. Alhaji Abubakar said also that Fatima church was guarded by the police but he could not explain the burning of the church and its pastorium in spite of the protection allegedly provided by the police.

In considering this aspect of the matter, reference must be made to the case of Alhaji Dahiru Sule, CW319 who, when arrested with a double barrel gun on 8th September, 2001, said it was given to him by the Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar. The investigating police officer, one CSP Momoh wrote an

Interim Report, to the Commissioner of Police, Exhibit 80B, in which he recommended that the suspect be released on bail because he appeared not to have committed any offence. Alhaji Abubakar told the Commission that he refused to approve the Report and issued a query to the officer, Exhibit 354, for taking Alhaji Dahiru Sule to Court on a First Information Report alleging inciting disturbance only while others arrested in connection with the disturbances were charged with the more serious offences of conspiracy, rioting, mischief by fire and unlawful possession of firearms.  Similarly, Alhaji Abubakar also queried one ASP Patricia Osaje for visiting the Magistrate’s Court where Dahiru Sule’s case was mentioned when she had no part to play in the investigation of the case.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.38 When however, he was asked in cross examination whether he queried any of the policemen who stood guarding the Central Mosque and watching while churches, shops and houses were being set ablaze he admitted that he did not. When further questioned on why he did not query the policemen for this more serious dereliction of duty he said at first that he could not do so because he left Plateau State immediately after the crisis. But when he was reminded that his transfer only came on 16th November, 2001, two months after the crisis, he said that he was too busy attending to other matters in his effort to restore peace and had no time to issue queries. How strange!

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.39 The Commission does not believe that he had any intention of querying the said policemen who looked the other way when the churches were burning and this must be because they had firm

instructions to guard only the Central Mosque. If that was not their instruction, they ought to have been queried because their conduct was more deserving of disciplinary measures than that of CSP Momoh and ASP Patricia Osaje.

4.40 On this score, it is clear to us that Alhaji Abubakar as Commissioner of Police ensured that the Central Mosque was adequately protected during the crisis but did not ensure that the churches, even those close to the Central Mosque, got the same or any protection at all. This is another evidence of his partisanship and the

inference from this and the other facts considered in (i) and (ii) above is that Alhaji Abubakar did play an active role in the escalation of the crisis, pitching his tent, as it were, in the camp of the muslims.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.41 The Commission’s conclusion from proved facts therefore is that Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, former Commissioner of Police, Plateau State is one of the persons who, by acts of commission and omission, contributed to the crisis and must be held responsible as such. For a man of his position into whose hands the safety of lives and properties of Nigerian citizens was entrusted to have displayed such unethical conduct in the performance of his duties is most unfortunate. Because much was given to him, much was also expected of him but in the Commission’s view, he did not justify the trust reposed in him.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.42 A Commissioner of Police of a State must bury his religious bias, leanings and inclinations qua superior police officer when he is performing his official duties of policing the state. He must, on no account, show to the public that he is either a Christian or a Muslim. In a country like Nigeria where religious belief is played to the gallery with all sentiment, thus affecting the sociological orientation of the people, the police must be seen as non-partisan in the regime of religion at all times and for all times. Unfortunately for Alhaji M. D. Abubakar, this was not the situation. He clearly showed his bias for the religion of Islam and his hatred for the religion of Christianity and this bias blinded his eyes, thoughts and orientation in the crisis of September, 2001 which resulted in the numerous killings.

 Government View:

Government notes.

4.43 In the light of the above, the Commission is of the view that Alhaji M. D. Abubakar be advised to retire from the Nigeria Police Force. In the event of his refusal to take the advice, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar should be dismissed from the service. The matter should be referred to the Police Service Commission for the appropriate disciplinary action as recommended above.

 Government View:

Government accepts.

Guide to Nigerian political lexicon

 By Elnathan John


It is no news how the shutting down of our oil can lead to a global hike in fuel prices. Everything we do and say should be important. As a foreigner following the recent goings-on in our polity, it is important to understand that words used in Nigeria may not be limited to their normal English meanings. I have therefore undertaken the thankless job of explaining the usage of certain terms in today’s Nigerian; only because I want the best for you.


Cabal

This is a word that is bandied about by the federal government. It means a group of people, some known, some unknown, some renowned. A member of the cabal is a person who performs political and economic magic, like amending the dates of landing of a fuel tanker in Nigeria to get paid more for fuel. A member of a cabal may or may not be a minister in the federal government. A member of a cabal will likely have a private jet. Their jets are a menace to more legitimate owners of jets like governors and pastors with huge followings. To have a friend in the cabal is to be in Nigerian heaven.


Palliatives

This is the current favourite word of the federal government. Palliatives are very important things, like buses, roads, schools, electricity, security, jobs. Usually the government would not think it necessary to provide these things, notwithstanding that certain items that seem like palliatives are budgeted every year. Make no mistake. They are not the same. Palliatives are a favour, given only because the government has recently, out of the kindness of their heart and to save our beloved nation from imminent bankruptcy, removed a criminal subsidy on petrol. This word is closely related to the phrase - ‘Cushioning the effect.’


Cushioning the effect

When you hear this phrase, you must let out a deep long sigh, for it is an important thing. It is graciousness, magnanimity. Being that government has the fear of god, when they do something adverse, like hike the prices of fuel, they cushion the effect of the blow by giving treats. Examples may or may not include things mentioned in ‘palliatives’. It may also include innovative things like special programs to re-invest money snatched out of poor people’s hands, so that poor people may enjoy. Because poor people are stingy, they do not like to let go of their little perks, like cheap fuel. So when you do necessary things like take it by force, you do something to give back. You cushion the effect.


Dastardly

Dastardly is a sacred word. It is a word made by Nigerian gods to describe particularly heinous crimes of the evil detractors of government. So every disaster that happens is dastardly. No presidential speech after a terrorist attack is complete without it. The act is dastardly. The perpetrator of the act is a detractor. When commiserating with government about an attack, you must call that attack dastardly.



Treason

This refers to the very heinous and dastardly act of insulting the president or by extension, the president’s wife. It is punishable by death and threats to perpetrators of this horrible crime are handled by State Security. They monitor sites like Twitter and Facebook, favourite hideouts for those who like to commit treason. Calling for the president to resign is tantamount to calling for regime change. This is treason. Punishable by death. And the suspension of your Twitter and Facebook accounts.


Boko Haram


Ah, a staple. This is the broadest group of people in Nigeria; the most reliable, the most trustworthy. They also claim responsibility for every attack, bombing and shooting. It is also legal to blame everything on them. So if you have a drinking problem, blame it on Boko Haram. You miss your period? It has to be Boko Haram. The name used to refer to a religious group who “saw through the evil that was Western Education” and rightly condemned it. More recently however, the group has claimed responsibility for many bombings and shootings of civilians. When Boko Haram says they will carry out an attack, it usually happens. It is impossible to keep them arrested for more than twenty four hours; they usually find a way to break out.  They have representatives in the police, the army, the executive, the legislature, the church, the mosque; they are omnipresent. You need them to travel safely around Nigeria.



As long as you understand these words, you are fine. We wish you all the best trying to understand them. The meanings of words in Nigeria, however, are subject to change without notice; like the price of fuel.