By Victoria Ibezim-Ohaeri
Spaces for Change’s latest report, Demolishing Foundations of Peace, found that North East Nigeria is one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a youth, especially a male teen. Among other findings, the study noted that young males were disproportionately targeted with violence in Borno, Kano, Yobe, Plateau and Bauchi states. Last week’s reported killing of 40 youths by security forces in Maiduguri attest to the frighteningly alarming dimension the counter-insurgency operations has assumed.
Spaces for Change’s latest report, Demolishing Foundations of Peace, found that North East Nigeria is one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a youth, especially a male teen. Among other findings, the study noted that young males were disproportionately targeted with violence in Borno, Kano, Yobe, Plateau and Bauchi states. Last week’s reported killing of 40 youths by security forces in Maiduguri attest to the frighteningly alarming dimension the counter-insurgency operations has assumed.
Slum, rural neighbourhoods
and other areas with very high concentration of youth populations are often
criminalized, and on that basis, raided repeatedly during manhunt exercises for
members of the Boko Haram sect. Trapped in the middle of persisting fierce
confrontations between the Islamic sect and JTF soldiers, there’s hardly any
family within communities like Budum, Kaleri, Abagaram, Zannari, Bulumkutu,
that has not lost a male son, male relative, uncle or father in the cycle of
violence that has enveloped the state for almost 3 years.
In Maiduguri, the horrendous
shooting and killing of young males by security forces is largely undocumented;
a situation worsened by inadequate media reportage of the volatile situation in
the state. Scores of newsmen I interviewed
at the Borno State House (Borno State Governor’s Office, Maiduguri) openly
expressed revulsion towards visiting designated flashpoints in the state. Selective
media coverage encourages under-reporting of the crisis, limits access to
credible information while preventing help from reaching those in critical
need. Disconcertingly too, the often-censored
news reports are rarely accompanied by the narratives of the people caught in
the middle of this spiraling conflict – the inhabitants of the Maiduguri.
A closed-door meeting at
the home of the village head (Bulama of Gilimanti Ward 2) of Budum community,
Maiduguri with about 50 elders and local youth in attendance, triggered a frank
discussion about the brutal killings, unlawful arrests, detention and
harassment of Maiduguri communities and inhabitants. Listening to the plethora of
personal accounts shared by owners of razed cars, buildings, shops, relatives
of slain and detained youths among several others, afforded a first-hand
opportunity to document how local residents are bearing the brunt of military
fury.
Seizing that moment of
agonizing frankness, I disclosed my keenness to meet with representatives of the
Boko Haram sect, and to understand the extent of the communities’ alleged involvement
in the sect’s activities, either by way of providing shelter or tacitly
supporting the sect’s terror activities. The residents swore they have nothing
to do with the sect, and further suggest that the attackers could be foreigners
from neighbouring Niger and Mali. Age-long familiar ties with those
neighbouring countries, and the porous borders criss-crossing the entire state
unhinders ingress and egress of foreigners into local communities.
One thing is clear: the unsubstantiated
branding of Maiduguri communities as habourers of terrorists is rife, forcing
public sympathy for the mass killings to wane. So bad is this negative branding
that the mere mention of certain communities such as Budum invokes images of
deranged young people blowing themselves up and overtly conniving with Boko
Haram members to facilitate violent terror attacks. This is totally unfounded! The
interactions with local residents also exposed that the greater the force
employed by the JTF, the more hesitant or unwilling affected populations are, to
cooperate and provide information to security operatives. Absolute mistrust and
fear continue to characterize the relationship between the security operatives
and the civilian populations, undermining intelligence undertakings that would
lead to the definite identification and extirpation of the sect’s members and
activities.
After the one hour-long closed
door meeting, a handful of local youths took turns to show me round their burnt
shops, displaying their blackened tailoring machines, textiles and wares. When the
frantic search for my driver, Sani, seemed futile, a local youth enthusiastically
provided a motorcycle that conveyed me and Kaigama to the home of Alhaji Sani Mohammed,
hit by JTF soldiers’ stray bullets. Still groaning in pains, and assisted to a
sitting position by one of his sons, he showed me the blood-soaked gunshot
wound on his waist. Alhaji Mohammed was shopping at the market when the army struck,
unleashing terror on everybody and every object insight. The closure of several
hospitals, combined with the fear of possible arrest and future attacks
propelled him to resort to home-treatment rendered by a local “chemist”.
Corroborating the
accounts of several persons
interviewed earlier, “I have never heard
so much gun shots in my entire life. People were running and many were falling.
I saw JTF soldiers loading dead bodies into their truck,” he said.
Reiterated claims of
soldiers taking corpses away prompted my visit to the University of Maiduguri
Teaching Hospital mortuary. Officials were too afraid to speak or be drawn into
any Boko Haram-related discussion. Luckily, Sani’s (my driver’s) located an
uncle, a senior medial officer, who worked in the Maxillofacial and Dental Unit
of the Hospital. With the help of Sani’s uncle, I had access to medical
records, and was able to discuss with a few doctors and paramedical personnel. Off-the-mark
statistics shared by the doctors affirmed an astronomical increase in the number
of patients receiving treatment for gunshot wounds and life-threatening facial
injuries. Routinely too, the hospital
authorities conduct mass burials for bullet-riddled corpses dumped at the mortuary
by soldiers. Speaking disapprovingly of JTF’s extreme use of force in the
handling of the Boko Haram insurgency, the doctors confirmed that most of the
victims, (both the dead and the injured) if not all, were young males, with
varying degrees of gunshot wounds.
Leaving the hospital, I
went to other predominantly Muslim settlements such as Kaleri and Gomari that
have also been the locale of fiery JTF interventions. At every 100 meters stood
a military check with soldiers boldly displaying AK-47 rifles with the look of
death in their eyes. The community wore a forlorn look, and eerie silence
pervading the entire locality loudly announced an unspoken despair. Many residents
have fled their homes, just as the heavy military presence is increasing the
psychological and economic strain on the general population. The security
crisis forced the closure of the only two public schools in Gomari community,
leaving many children of school age without access to education.
Large numbers of people,
especially women vehemently refused to answer any questions bordering on the activities
of the sect. All the men I interviewed, including a vocal local imam – that runs
an Islamiya School in Gomari - strongly
objected to questions suggesting that Boko Haram sect members were being haboured
within their communities. The locals insisted that all those captured and
killed by the soldiers are innocent citizens who have nothing to do with the Boko
Haram sect. For instance, a week before my visit, a doctor, staff of the
University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital was brutally murdered, alongside 11
other men by JTF soldiers minutes after a bomb exploded beside a primary school
in Kaleri. The late doctor and his wife were driving past the school at the
time of the incident. In line with JTF’s combat strategy of marking every human within the vicinity of an
explosion site as a military target, he was among the 12 men sprayed with
bullets. The Borno State Governor, Kashim Shettima profusely apologized for the
error, and compensated grieving families. Stories of similar gaffes abound.
Totally
incensed by the deluge of harrowing stories and experiences shared both by
victims and eye witnesses, I stormed the Headquarters of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) in Maiduguri
to present the freshly-collected evidence of extrajudicial killings to the authorities,
as a basis for demanding for justice for the affected populations. In my discussions
with very senior police officers in charge of field and anti-bomb operations in
the state, my advocacy harped on the need to urgently review the JTF’s operational
methods, and for combat strategies to be aligned with the democratic
environment and respect for human rights. The police authorities neither
affirmed nor denied the killings, but lectured me on the origin, trigger
factors, and hazardous nature of Boko Haram’s campaign of terror. This was a
different type of warfare, requiring different training and weapons. I also
learned about the technical, intelligence, social and logistical readiness of
the NPF for a specialized combat operation, and how they manage the high costs
associated with such large scale warfare.
While
it is true that deteriorating security situation necessitated the State’s
security apparatus, Operation Flush, to be subsumed into the (Federal
Government-controlled) JTF, however, the command chain, the tactical
disposition and crime busting strategies of the police (NPF) and the military(JTF)
remain fairly distinct. For instance, I observed that while the police highly
favoured an anti-terror approach centered on community policing and intelligence
gathering, the military emphasized deterrence and preemption. In seeking to
deter attacks from the insurgents, JTF emphasizes a strategy based on massive
responses to attacks, resulting in high collateral damages. It became clearer
to me why increasing calls for JTF’s withdrawal had persisted, while local preference
for the police (NPF) takeover soars. Such
calls are however, seemingly oblivious of the police’s (NPF’s) lack of
strategic depth and its impossibility of maintaining reserve mobilization for
an extended period.
Armed
with that detailed background information about the counter-terrorism operations,
I headed straight to the JTF Headquarters at Ponponmari, Maiduguri.
To
be continued.
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